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MORE TROUBLES FOR COMESA ~NA AND TAL
Abstract. Comesa~na and Tal have used a contentious account of evidence pos-
session to claim that an \evidence of evidence is evidence" principle of R. Feld-
man (EEE3) is (true but) trivial. We demonstrate to the contrary that, on the
Comesa~na{Tal account of evidence possession, EEE3 is false.
1. Introduction
R. Feldman1 has defended, in several pieces, a thesis of evidentialism{that one's
belief that p is justied if and only if the balance of one's evidence supports p. One
of the issues at stake in this theorizing is how one ought to respond to cases of peer
disagreement. Should one \stick to one's guns", or \compromise deeply and often"?
Should one assign \equal weight" to one's own attitudes and those of a peer{and if
so, how? Should one always defer to the balance of one's evidence? In support of the
latter view, Feldman (2009) proposes that there are no true general principles (such
as, e.g., split the dierence) about how one ought to respond to cases of disagreement
(other than, of course, \defer to the evidence"). On the other hand, he writes:
While there may be no special general principles about jus-
tied responses to disagreements, there are facts about the
evidential impact of disagreements. I remain sympathetic to
the conciliatory view that evidence of peer disagreement is
often signicant evidence against one's view.
Feldman sometimes uses the slogan \evidence of evidence is evidence" for this \con-
ciliatory view". He makes precise and defends the underlying principle in his (2014).
B. Fitelson (2012) and J. Comesa~na and E. Tal (2015) have recently discussed one
version of this principle, called EEE3. Fitelson claims that EEE3 is false and oers
a counterexample. Comesa~na and Tal oer a refutation of this counterexample and
claim that EEE3 is true, albeit trivially.
It is important to ag the fact that Comesa~na and Tal's analysis depends crucially on
a novel and contentious account of evidence possession. (If one denies this account
of evidence possession, their refutation of Fitelson evaporates.) Our purpose here
isn't to judge the aptness of the account, but to show that Comesa~na and Tal were
mistaken; even accepting their account of evidence possession, EEE3 remains false.2
1A previous version of this paper was rejected (in 177 days) by Analysis against the advice of the
original referees on the basis of an unambiguously fallacious third report. Four days later I sent 
this version to Dialectica, who have sat on it unresponsively for (as of this writing) 796 days.
2Feldman (2014) responds to Fitelson's proposed counterexample by oering still dierent takes
on EEE3 as well as a new formulation, running \If S has evidence, E1, supporting the proposition
that there is someone who has evidence that supports p, then S has some evidence, E2, that supports
p." We are attempting to make a case against neither Feldman nor Fitelson here.
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(EEE3): If S1 possesses evidence (E1) which supports the
claim that S2 possesses evidence (E2) which supports p, then
S1 possesses evidence (E3) which supports p.
Here is Fitelson's proposed counterexample to EEE3. Let
E1 = Card c is black;
E2 = Card c is the Ace of Spades;
p = Card c is an Ace.
It is supposed that S1 knows that Card c (selected uniformly at random from a
standard deck of playing cards) has been viewed by S2, and that S1 has evidence E1.
Given these assumptions, E1 supports the claim that S2 possesses E2. E2 meanwhile
entails p so by EEE3 S1 ought to have evidence supporting p. However, E1 does not
support p. So goes the \counterexample". (In this example, the proposition \that
S2 possesses evidence (E2)" is eectively identied with E2 itself; S1 knows that S2
has looked at the card. We restrict to scenarios of that sort, but note the original,
more general formulation.)
Comesa~na and Tal claim that Fitelson's example fails because S1 does \possess evi-
dence" which supports p, e.g.
E3 = Card c is not the Jack of Hearts.
Comesa~na and Tal's assumption here appears to be (at minimum) that a sucient
condition for \S1 possesses evidence for p" is that S1 justiedly assigns full credence
to some true proposition E for which Prob(pjE) > Prob(p). (Here Prob is some
agreed-upon background prior; in the example it is of course that which assigns
probability 1
52
to each card.) Though a more typical account would require that
Prob(pjE) > Prob(p) for strongest proposition E that one knows, the idea here, it
seems, is that a bystander having no prior evidence would in adopting S1's credence
in E as their own and updating by conditionalization would come to have a higher
credence in p.
The Comesa~na{Tal account of evidence possession is counterintuitive and liberal in
the extreme; on it, even an agent that had learned Card c is not a Black Ace would
\possess evidence" supporting Card c is the Ace of Spades. (Card c is not the Ace of
Clubs, for example.) Again, though, our purpose here is not to judge the aptness of
the account, but to determine its ramications for EEE3.
Having defused Fitelson's counterexample to their satisfaction, Comesa~na and Tal
proceed to make the claim that (on their account of evidence possession, which will
be in eect throughout the remainder of this paper) \there cannot be counterexamples
to EEE3...because EEE3 is trivial." Indeed that \For any pair of propositions E and
p (about which the subject in question is not already certain), something entailed by
E supports p: for instance, the disjunction either E or p".
Comesa~na and Tal's suggestion is thus to take E3 = E1 _ p. The problem with this
suggestion, however, is that E1 _ p fails to support p when E1 _ p is certain. And of
course E1 _ p may be certain, even when neither E1 nor p is. This undercuts their
\triviality" claim, and as it turns out EEE3 is not trivial at all. In fact, it's false.
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We'll assume in establishing this that there is a largest proposition algebra A on
which the \background prior" is dened. We will consider a case in which S1's total
evidence proposition (i.e. the maximally specic proposition in A known by S1 to
be true) is some probabilistically non-trivial E0. Now take E1 to be any non-trivial
proposition in A that is entailed by, but not probabilistically equivalent to, E0. Next
put E2 = E1 ^:E0. Finally, let p = :E0. Since E0 entails E1, E1 is evidence that S1
has. Since E2 entails E1 and E1 is non-trivial, E1 is evidence for E2. And of course
E2 entails p and so is evidence for it. The antecedent of EEE3 is therefore satised,
but we claim that the consequent is not.
Indeed, any evidence E3 2 A possessed by S1 must be entailed by E0 and so cannot
conrm p = :E0. It is meanwhile unclear that any E3 62 A can constitute evidence
for p, given that Prob(pjE3) will not exist. We see one plausible attempt. If S1's
total evidence proposition were E1 rather than E0 then one might try to claim that
E3 = my current credence in E2 is  = Prob(E2jE1)
is evidence for p on the grounds that a bystander accepting it would be justied in
adopting S1's credence in E2 as their own and updating (by Jerey conditionalization,
Jerey 1965) their credence in p to  + (1   )Prob(pj:E2) > Prob(p). Given that
S1's total evidence proposition is E0 = :p, however, this move is unavailable.
One may sacrice realism for concreteness by setting A equal to some xed nite
algebra of propositions. For example, if A consists just in the 252 propositions con-
straining Card c to a subset of a standard deck of playing cards, one may set
E0 = Card c is the Ace of Spades;
E1 = Card c is a black Ace;
E2 = Card c is the Ace of Clubs;
p = Card c is not the Ace of Spades.
Of course, such A is not realistic and once one incorporates additional knowledge and
allows expansion of background probability to a larger algebra of propositions things
go awry. If one knows for example that a certain toss of a fair coin landed heads, then
:(Card c is the Ace of Spades ^ tails) becomes evidence for Card c is not the Ace of
Spades on the obvious extension of background probability. It follows that in any
realistic setting, where one is cognizing in real time and thus constantly acquiring
new evidence, counterexamples to EEE3 are apt to be eeting.
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